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The effect of identity preserved premiums on a grain elevator’s received volumes is modeled 
using stochastic simulation across the harvest season.  A feedback loop simulates competing 
elevators’ bid prices and tracks producer delivery decisions using arbitrage criteria at competing 
market elevators. Results provide information about the sensitivity of distance thresholds in 
producer delivery decisions given IP premiums. 
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For any given grain elevator, information flows among producers, end users, and 
competitor grain elevators.  These three categories of market participants generate market-level 
information that is used internally to maximize the profitability of a particular elevator.   
In large part, producer-generated information revolves around total grain volume, as well 
as the types and quality characteristics of grains produced.  Annual production forecasts, based 
on historical trend, provide elevators with estimates of grains available to be supplied to an 
elevator.  Often greater uncertainty surrounds not the total volumes produced, but rather the 
distribution of grain types and qualities.  In addition, the elevator is concerned with the 
producer’s transport costs.  The combination of three factors, distance to elevator, elevator bid 
price, and producer transport costs per mile, determine which elevator receives the producer’s 
grain.  Or, the possibility exists that the elevator is by-passed altogether in the case of direct 
producer to end-user shipment.  In short, factors influencing arbitrage conditions are critical 
pieces of producer-generated information used by elevator management.   
With respect to end users, the three most likely outlets for corn and soybean usage from 
the Eastern Corn Belt are food processors (such as crushing mills, wet or dry corn milling, etc.), 
feed lots, or barge facilities in preparation for export.  Historical trends provide reasonable 
estimates for grain usage by type of user.  Food processors and feedlots have exhibited fairly 
consistent demand patterns over time with greater variation seen in the volumes demanded in 
export markets.   
A commodity-based grain marketing environment invites cost minimization because of 
high-volume, low-margin product characteristics.  Commodity-intensive markets encourage  3  
elevator managers to attract the largest grain volumes possible, subject to facility configuration 
constraints, at the lowest possible per unit cost. Attracting grain flows to an elevator is a function 
of arbitrage conditions, in turn highlighting the bid price-producer distance relationship.  
Because commodities do not draw over cash price premia, the producer’s shipping cost to an 
elevator is the determining factor in their delivery decision. 
The variable premium structure associated with identity preserved (IP) grains, however, 
implies a shift in the weight, or value, that bid prices and producer distances carry relative to one 
another, as producers evaluate their best delivery option.  Per bushel IP premiums offered at a 
mid-range distance elevator could offset the higher transportation cost of delivery compared to 
those of a closer elevator not offering the same premium.  More specifically, IP premiums 
influence the market boundaries at which elevators compete for producer deliveries.  Thus, an 
elevator’s competitive strategy should incorporate information about competitor elevators’ bid 
prices.  Assuming competing elevators are angling for the same grain types in a market area, a 
better understanding of a competitor’s bid price distribution might translate into a competitive 
pricing strategy advantage.  
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect of competitor bid price offerings on a 
case study elevator’s grain flows during the harvest season.  This paper is an effort to better 
understand the extent to which grain flows are altered with incremental changes and variation in 
the closest competitors’ marketing margin.  Particular emphasis is placed on examination of 
arbitrage conditions in so far as they drive producer delivery decisions.   
The intent of this paper is to build on one part of Maltsbarger’s IP-opportunity cost 
argument using stochastic market feedback.  In particular, grain volumes lost to competitors is 
lost revenue, if an elevator could have received, handled, and stored the same grain without  4  
compromising operational efficiency.  Operational efficiency is further complicated by IP grains 
through attribute preservation assurance.  The results of this study play a role in evaluating the 
economic impacts of IP grain production at the elevator level.  The grain flows examined in this 
study can be used with cost estimates and blending models to determine the total economic 
impact on a given elevator’s profitability.  However, a thorough understanding of the 
competitive situation and grain flows are a necessary first step to understanding this problem.   
The paper is divided into 5 sections.  First, previous studies are reviewed for their 
contribution to this discussion of market area definition, assembly costs, and arbitrage 
conditions.  The second section discusses the methodology.  Third, the paper outlines model 
details including scenario and variable specification, as well as model assumptions.  Scenario 
results are presented in section four.  The paper concludes with an interpretation of broader, 
market consequences implied by the results and suggests future extensions of this research. 
 
Literature Review 
Three themes in the literature are reviewed.  First, spatial price differentials are examined 
as a function of micro-market structure.  Second, the role of producer assembly costs is 
addressed as it influences elevator manager’s perception of total facility costs.  Third, a review of 
arbitrage conditions follows to the extent that they influence a grain elevator’s market definition.   
The degree to which micro-market structure explains spatial grain price differentials is 
motivated by observation that price differentials exist which cannot be attributed to time, space, 
and form cost variables (Jones; Davis and Hill; McCully).  Market variables related to elevator 
scale and scope, elevator transport options, and proximity to competitors are used to capture 
market structure effects.  The breadth of marketing services offered by an elevator, as well as  5  
competitor density emerge as salient factors influencing elevator bid prices (Jones, Davis and 
Hill; Wenzel et al.).   
Wenzel et al. identify three factors contributing to an elevator’s ability to offer alternative 
bid prices: (1) local supply and demand conditions, (2) firm productive efficiency, and (3) 
operating practices.  This research addresses two of these factors. First, local demand and supply 
conditions are fixed in any given grain marketing year thereby making elevator managers in a 
given market area compete for a fixed volume in the short run.  Second, this research draws 
attention to the efficiency-volume/type trade-off.  Identity preservation likely hinders operational 
efficiency, relative to the commodity-only scenario.  Because an elevator offers higher IP 
premiums compared to their competitors does not imply they have achieved greater operational 
efficiency.  One of the challenges for elevator managers is to identify how to most effectively 
adjust bid prices without compromising operational efficiency.  This research highlights the 
inter-relatedness of Wenzel et al.’s second and third market factors, namely operational 
efficiency and operating practices. 
Operational efficiency connotes maximum output at the lowest possible cost, subject to 
technological/production constraints.  Misreading costs can hinder achieving operational 
efficiency.  Araji and Walsh (1969) find that inclusion of previously omitted assembly costs 
significantly impacts the elevator’s cost curves.
1  Previous studies maintained that storage, 
handling, and loading grains processes provided a complete cost summary.  Under this 
assumption, indirect (marketing) costs are overlooked. 
In a commodity only environment, average costs are non-increasing as economies of 
scale are recognized.  The average total costs should also stabilize with larger throughput 
                                                 
1 Assembly cost factors are defined here as “grain sales density and the costs of hauling grain from farm to elevator” 
(Araji and Walsh, 36).  6  
volumes.  Araji and Walsh argue, however, that exclusion of assembly costs guides managers to 
expand facility size beyond what is the true profit maximizing capacity.  That is, assembly costs, 
which are a function of grain sales density and producer transport costs, increase with distance.  
Managers basing their decisions on market area volume need also consider producer-elevator 
distances in determining which facility receives the grain.  Producers traveling greater distances 
incur greater assembly costs, assuming a constant per mile truck cost.  At some distance though, 
producers will deliver to another facility.  In this respect, assembly costs are a type of 
opportunity cost.  Managers who pursue increased storage capacity without considering 
assembly costs will overestimate their optimal size, by misunderstanding market boundaries.  
Inclusion of a feedback mechanism draws attention to arbitrage conditions.  Elevators in 
any given market are assumed to be price takers and thus all confront the same terminal cash 
market price (Dooley and Wilson).  Factors then affecting arbitrage conditions include 
producers’ assembly/transportation costs and elevator pricing strategies (Dooley and Wilson), or    
  
where j = elevator competing with case study elevator i, 
P = price paid to producer by elevator i or j 
t = linear transportation cost incurred by producer for elevator delivery, and  
d = distance, in miles, from farm to elevator i or j. 
Equation 1 offers a firm-level approach to examining competitive forces in a grain 
market, in addition to making allowances for multiple facilities per market (Dooley and Wilson).  
Using equation 1, producers compare delivery profit margins across all facilities, choosing the 
one with the highest return for them.  Three assumptions parameterize the model.  First, it is 
assumed that producers deliver to the elevator offering the highest price net of transportation 
costs.  Second, it is assumed that producers face uniform linear transport/assembly costs across 
the market area.  Finally, there is no allowance for price discrimination by elevators to producers.  
j i td P td P i i j j ≠ − = − , ) 1 ( 7  
Findings suggest that elevators raise their bid prices to offset competitors’ lower margins.  
For example, if an elevator expands their transport capabilities to include multi-car rail 
shipments, it effectively lowers their transport costs.  These “savings” are then passed along to 
producers in the form of higher bid prices.  The smaller, single-car elevator’s (defensive) 
response is to match the higher bid price so as to retain market share.  These findings suggest 
two points.  First, the terminal price by itself is relevant only insofar as it affects elevators’ 
market spreads.  For example, if the cash price increases by $0.05 but all elevators change their 
bid prices by the same amount, the terminal price had no impact on the arbitrage conditions.  
Second, elevator managers are limited in their ability to use bid prices as a means of market 
boundary expansion due to the impact of producer transport costs. 
 
Methodology 
This analysis focuses on the impacts changes in arbitrage conditions have on a case study 
elevator’s grain flows.  Changes in a competitor’s marketing margins are viewed as being 
derived from managerial decisions regarding asset configuration or pricing strategies.  Grain 
flows are directed toward or away from the case study elevator, depending on competitors’ bid 
prices.  The premise is that, within a given market, slight changes in elevator bid prices are 
capable of drawing grain away from one facility to another.   
A schematic of the model flow is provided in Figure 1.  The model begins assuming that 
grain producers stand ready to deliver harvest season grain.  The first flow in Figure 1 is 
informational – price signals are sent by elevators, and interpreted by producers (represented by 
solid lines).  Producers then evaluate all market arbitrage opportunities using equation 1 as their 
guide.  Producers will choose to deliver their grain to the facility whose bid price offers the  8  
highest margin once transportation expenses have been paid.  The second flow is physical 
product, from producers to the grain facilities, denoted by dashed lines.   
 
Figure 1.  Flowchart of Model with Feedback Mechanism 
 
Model Specification 
A stochastic simulation model using @RISK® examines the effect of competitor 
elevators’ bid price offerings on grain flows to a case study elevator.  These effects are evaluated 
across an illustrative 12-week production period, September to November.  Weekly production 
volumes are based on the 2002 crop progress schedule and a 5-year yield average for Number 2 
corn and Number 1 soybeans in north central Indiana (NASS-IN).  The selected grain market is a 
circular market area 50 miles in diameter, with the case study elevator located at the center.  
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distributed evenly across the market area.  Three of the 4 competing elevators are located within 
15 miles of the case study elevator.  The fourth elevator is assumed to be located just inside the 
market boundary.  
Each week, equation 1 allocates available grain flows to all grain elevators in a given 
market area.  Each producer in the market is assumed to deliver to the facility offering the 
highest return, net of transportation costs.   
Changes to asset configuration may lower operational costs that can then be passed on to 
producers in terms of higher bid prices.  It is also possible that changes to asset configuration 
could raise operational costs.  Management’s involvement in pricing wars may lead to changes in 
bid offerings to producers.  Again, the priority is the case study elevator’s competitive response 
to other market participants, not so much the derivation or impetus of a competitor’s move.   
Changes in competitor IP premiums are interpreted relative to a baseline scenario absent 
of price premiums.  That is, grain flows are modeled using the market prices for all grain types 
with no additional premium being offered by competing elevators.  Scenario 2-4 adds a $0.02 
over price premium to competitors 1, 2, and the case study elevator sequentially.  A final 
scenario evaluates the impact of offered premium variability, as the standard deviation in 
competitor 2’s IP price distribution is reduced.  Identity preserved grain price distributions are 
the same across IP grain types per competitor.   
 
Data 
Construction of market area, producer, and grain facility profiles draws largely on data 
provided by managers at the case study elevator and from Indiana Agricultural Select Indiana 
counties are the building blocks of the given market area.  Producer profiles are based on three  10 
pieces of information: (1) producer density in the market area, (2) production volumes by farm 
size, of acreage harvested, and (3) geographic location.  Competitor elevator data, specifically 
geographic location and bid price offerings, is defined relative to a case study elevator’s location 
and historical cash price series. 
The market area is defined as a six county region consisting of the five counties adjacent 
to the case study elevator, plus the county in which the case study elevator is located.  These 
counties consistently appear in the state’s top 10 corn and soybean rankings for total production 
and yield per acre in Indiana (IN NASS).  In the six county market area, small farms (200-499 
acres) account for 43 percent, or 610 of the total 1,405 farms (Table 1).  Mid-size farms (500-999 
acres) and large (1000+ acres) farms, account for 32 percent (454 farms) and 24 percent (341 
farms) respectively (IN-NASS).   
 
Table 1.  Illustrative Farm Production Profile 








Producer production volume.  Similarly, county production volumes are gathered from 
the Indiana Department of Agriculture.  Total production volume from 1997 USDA Census data 
is divided by the number of producers, per county, and then averaged across the six county area 
(Table 1).  A total of 124 medium and large (size) producers are randomly selected for IP–only 
production.  Small producers are assumed to produce only commodity grains. 
  Grain types and production yields.  The model uses a total of six grain types, three each 
of corn and soybeans (Table 2).  Corn varieties include Number 2, nutritionally dense, and white   11 
corn.  Bean varieties include Number 1, high protein, and tofu soybeans.  A lack of IP yield data 
existed for Indiana so a yield-rule was created using Illinois data.  This rule identifies IP yields as 
a percent of commodity yields (UIUC, The Value Project); the same commodity-IP yield 
relationship is applied to Indiana commodity yields to achieve an Indiana-based IP yield (IN-
NASS).  Per acre commodity yields are based on 5-year averages, 1997-2002 (IN-NASS).  All 
grain type yields are deterministic.  A total of 285,200 acres, or approximately 27 % of total 
market acreage, is allotted to IP production.   
 
Table 2.  Grain Type and Production Yields 
Grain Type  Yield (Bushels per Acre) 
Number 2 corn  139 
Nutritionally dense  132 
White 118 
  
Number 1 soybeans  44 
High protein  41 
Tofu 38 
Source:  University of Illinois, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, “The 
Value Project: Improving Farm Incomes and Rural Communities through Value-Added 
Agriculture.”  http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/value/Default.htm 
 
 
  Producer location.  Producers are assumed to be evenly distributed across a circular 
market (radius 25 miles) area relative to a case study elevator location. The circular market area 
is characterized by 5-mile radial increments along which it is assumed producers are located.  
The radial increments are identified a through e, beginning closest to the facility and working 
outwards.  The circular market area is further divided into quadrants.  Thus, producer location is 
identified by quadrant and radial increment.  The number of small, medium and large producers, 
per quadrant per radial increment, is calculated as a percent of harvested acreage each sector 
contributes to the quadrant.  Each producer has a randomly generated location that is held fixed.    12 
A range of possible distances to the grain facility is identified based on intersecting 
radials of a particular competitor elevator’s and case study elevator’s locale.  A minimum 
distance of two miles is established for radial a.  Each quadrant contains one competitor grain 
elevator in addition to the market area’s centrally located case study elevator.   
  Transportation.  It is assumed that all producers confront the same $ 0.02 per bushel per 
mile linear transportation cost as per the 2002 Iowa Farm Custom Rate Survey (Iowa State 
University).  A transportation cost is calculated for each of the four competing elevators per 
producer per week. 
Arbitrage Conditions.  The distribution of grain flows across facilities is a function of 
Equation 1.  All grain handling facilities are assumed to confront the same cash price 
distribution.  However, factors within the firm may afford the firm more, or less, flexibility in the 
range of prices they can offer to producers.  For example, a facility which can achieve higher 
efficiency levels may be able to offer higher bid prices to attract larger volumes to their facility 
because they have lowered their cost structure.  The elevator’s ability to achieve higher profit 
levels is conditioned on maintaining a competitive cost advantage.  Should other facilities 
achieve similar efficiency levels, the first mover advantage is compromised and possibly even 
evaporates.  It is also possible that elevator managers are less aggressive with pricing strategies 
in high production volume years, where competition has eroded a competitive advantage, or the 
grain market returns to a commodity-only scenario.
2   
Grain facilities are all subject to the same market/cash price and premia per grain type.  
The terminal cash price series observed at the case study elevator across fifteen years is the 
foundation for competitors’ price series.  A weekly, indexed cash price is estimated at the case 
                                                 
2 For example, currently non-GMO grains are classified as IP grains.  In the event that demand for non-GMO grains 
increases so as to rival standard commodity volumes, the previously considered IP grain would become another 
commodity grain type.    13 
study elevator using an empirical distribution. Weekly cash prices are indexed to a 15-year 
marketing average to more effectively capture week and year variability.  Competitor price 
series’ use the case study elevator’s estimated weekly prices as a base; variability is added 
through stochastic adjustments to the case study elevator’s price mean and standard deviation.  
Price adjustments are based on a probable pricing strategy employed by the competitor given 
their type of facility (i.e., small, IP niche market elevator) (Table 3).  
Identity preserved premiums are based on 2003 data as provided by the University of 
Illinois’s Value Project.  The IP corn premiums are $0.22 per bushel (nutritionally dense corn) 
and $0.10 (white corn).  The IP soybean premiums are $0.90 per bushel (high protein soybeans) 
and $1.45 (tofu soybeans). 
Competitor Location and Distance.  Competitor facilities are incorporated into the market 
area based on discussions with elevator management.  Four types of competitors are identified 
(Table 3).  Competitor one is assumed to specialize in niche, or IP, market grains, located 
approximately 15 miles northwest of the case study elevator (Figure 2, example).  Competitor 
two is assumed to be a terminal facility of similar storage capacity and bin configuration, relative 
to the case study elevator, located 15 miles northeast of the case study elevator.  Competitor 
three is assumed to be a processor receiving grain deliveries directly from producers and located 
approximately 25 miles southeast of the case study elevator.  A fourth competitor is a 
commodity-only facility situated 15 miles southwest of the case study elevator.  Competitor 
four’s capacity and configuration closely parallel that of the case study elevator’s.  
  14 
 





Characteristics*  Likely Variability in 
Bid Price Distribution 
1  15 miles 
NW 
 - Niche market elevator 
 - Storage capabilities: more bins of 
smaller volume  
-  Primarily truck transport from facility 
Different mean,   
different standard 
deviation 
2  15 miles 
NE 
- Large, inland terminal elevator 
- Similar storage capacity and 
configuration  
Same mean,  
same standard 
deviation 
3  25 miles 
SE 
- Processing facility utilizing direct 
delivery from producers 
- More storage capacity than niche 
market elevator but less than case 
study elevator 
Same mean,   
different standard 
deviation 
4  15 miles 
SW 
- Large inland terminal elevator 
handling commodity grains only 
- Similar storage capacity and 
configuration 
Same mean, same 
deviation 







Quadrant I Quadrant I
Quadrant III
Quadrant IV
Figure 2:  Case Study Elevator-Competing Elevator Spatial Relationship
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Results 
Results from the grain flow model are presented in Tables 4-8.  Results are 
interpreted from the case study elevator’s perspective across the premium scenarios.  
Table 4 presents baseline results which assume no additional premium above the per 
bushel market value.  Results model suggest absent additional premiums, the case study 
elevator would attract all 6 types of grain.  Commodity corn and soybean volumes 
determined in the model closely resemble actual volumes received.  Relative to other 
competitors also drawing all 6 grain types, the case study elevator attracts the smallest 
absolute volumes.  Competitors 1 and 2 are almost equally competitive for IP soybean 
grains; competitor 2 is also competes with competitor 4, a commodity-only facility.  
Scenario 2 evaluates grain flows when competitor 1 offers an additional $0.02 per 
bushel premium (Table 5).  The case study elevator draws smaller volumes of both types 
of commodity grains and none of the high protein soybeans.  Total volume of tofu 
soybeans, however, increases almost two fold.  Competitor 3’s lack of tofu beans 
suggests that producers could have received higher returns at closer distances, thus 
distributing tofu volumes among the case study elevator and competitors 1 and 2. 
When competitor 2 introduces a $0.02 over-price premium, its volumes of nutritionally 
dense and tofu grains increase by over 800,000 and 50,000 bushels respectively, relative 
to the baseline scenario (Table 6).  Interestingly, this impacts the case study elevator by 
increasing all IP volumes except high protein soybeans of which the elevator now 
receives none.  Presumably, the case study elevator is picking up IP volumes from 
quadrant IV of the market area the elevator now receives none.   
  16 
Table 4.  Grain Flows Across Market Area (Baseline Scenario) 
 Grain  Variety 
   #2 Corn  Nutritionally 
Dense  White #1  Soybeans  High Protein  Tofu 
  (Bushels) 
Case Study Elevator        
Mean 10,080,699  581,326  641,568  3,083,835  230,087  213,574 
Standard Deviation  581,651  245,766  14,274  0  6,495  0 
Minimum 9,427,817  41,095  613,888  3,083,835  217,790  213,574 
Maximum 11,933,455  1,125,347  673,919  3,083,835  236,118  213,574 
Competitor 1        
Mean   1,296,037  1,479,249  504,438  486,515 
Standard Deviation    223,386  25,750  9,938  0 
Minimum   221,137  1,429,695  496,121  486,515 
Maximum     1,474,409  1,578,222    530,069  486,515 
Competitor 2        
Mean 18,632,577  1,111,298  1,273,010  5,941,709  445,332  423,082 
Standard Deviation  246,767  247,928  12,036  0  3,464  0 
Minimum 17,834,318  160,002  1,219,481  5,941,709  434,540  423,082 
Maximum 18,921,190  1,334,227  1,290,271  5,941,709  447,607  423,082 
Competitor 3        
Mean 10,269,300  1,030,806  890,616  3,274,946  309,470  294,518 
Standard Deviation  118,797  631,140  1,803  0  421  0 
Minimum 9,839,364  152,438  871,042  3,274,946  306,577  294,518 
Maximum 10,369,772  3,353,416  891,107  3,274,946  309,622  294,518 
Competitor 4        
Mean 14,837,263    4,735,774   
Standard Deviation  217,101    0    
Minimum 14,212,703    4,735,774   
Maximum 15,101,059       4,735,774      
 
  Table 7 illustrates the impact of the case study elevator’s offering a $0.02 over 
price premium.  Relative to the baseline, the elevator only attracts more of the lower-
valued IP corn varieties and IP soybean volumes actually fall by approximately half.  
Even with the higher premium compared to competitors, the case study elevator is still 
not attracting the higher value IP varieties.   17 
 
Table 5.  Grain Flows Across Market Area (Scenario: Competitor 1 pays $0.02 premium/IP 
bushel) 
 Grain  Variety 
   #2 Corn  Nutritionally 
Dense  White #1  Soybeans  High Protein  Tofu 
  (Bushels) 
Case Study Elevator        
Mean 9,046,997  621,568  749,271  2,744,542  0  421,916 
Standard Deviation  578,789  255,090  21,980  2,731  0  12,466 
Minimum 8,409,998  60,504  611,042  2,669,853  0  330,224 
Maximum 10,915,636  1,086,939  787,615  2,746,210  0  427,148 
Competitor 1        
Mean   1,339,616  1,489,026  296,267  488,363 
Standard Deviation    173,438  41,695  11,233  12,300 
Minimum   235,976  1,197,538  221,552  384,400 
Maximum     1,505,378  1,630,653    320,913  509,901 
Competitor 2        
Mean 19,327,574  1,137,663  1,299,802  6,168,383  120,160  462,561 
Standard Deviation  249,731  220,064  61,387  5,471  24,818  24,073 
Minimum 18,487,976  163,877  1,198,941  6,129,329  88,600  435,791 
Maximum 19,628,020  1,738,247  1,849,373  6,170,657  397,242  658,215 
Competitor 3        
Mean 10,273,568  804,911  615,619  3,277,156  1,026,813  0 
Standard Deviation  116,131  568,400  12,833  7,359  17,737  0 
Minimum 9,840,215  87,539  495,765  3,273,710  824,447  0 
Maximum 10,445,747  3,288,712  622,808  3,462,220  1,053,733  0 
Competitor 4        
Mean 15,171,700    4,846,183   
Standard Deviation  215,717    6,562   
Minimum 14,521,210    4,774,863   
Maximum 15,455,446       4,882,871      
 
The final scenario evaluates the effect on market grain flows as one competitor 
reduces the variability in their $0.01 over premium price (Table 8).  Competitor 2’s price 
distribution and facility configuration are designed to closely mirror those of the case 
study elevator.  The impact on the case study elevator is similar to the effects from a 
competitor $0.02 premium: commodity volumes fall slightly, the lower-valued IP corn 
variety volumes increase and higher-valued IP soybean varieties decrease (in the case of 
high protein, they fall to 0).  Ultimately, the magnitude of the premium and change in  18 
degree of variability will determine the impact on the case study elevator’s grain flows 
but it appears that the 2 effects cause the same directional changes for the case study 
elevator relative to baseline results.  
 
Table 6.  Grain Flows Across Market Area (Scenario: Competitor 2 pays $0.02 premium/IP 
bushel) 
 Grain  Variety 
   #2 Corn  Nutritionally 
Dense  White #1  Soybeans  High Protein  Tofu 
  (Bushels) 
Case Study Elevator        
Mean 9,046,997  628,250  743,593  2,744,542  0  415,332 
Standard Deviation  578,789  253,300  28,356  2,731  0  18,334 
Minimum 8,409,998  59,477  609,885  2,669,853  0  291,981 
Maximum 10,915,636  1,094,916  791,007  2,746,210  0  427,148 
Competitor 1        
Mean   1,300,736  1,443,906  285,513  474,024 
Standard Deviation    170,727  49,194  13,924  16,211 
Minimum   225,618  1,150,147  209,298  367,586 
Maximum     1,462,412  1,577,731    313,165  486,515 
Competitor 2        
Mean 19,327,574  1,196,490  1,355,044  6,168,383  148,805  483,482 
Standard Deviation  249,731  227,590  83,262  5,471  33,823  34,071 
Minimum 18,487,976  173,375  1,251,863  6,129,329  117,988  459,176 
Maximum 19,628,020  1,917,235  1,897,921  6,170,657  426,899  703,781 
Competitor 3        
Mean 10,273,568  778,722  611,174  3,277,156  1,008,922  0 
Standard Deviation  116,131  563,397  18,207  7,359  22,948  0 
Minimum 9,840,215  84,807  495,765  3,273,710  807,044  0 
Maximum 10,445,747  3,284,827  622,808  3,462,220  1,031,712  0 
Competitor 4        
Mean 15,171,700    4,846,183   
Standard Deviation  215,717    6,562   
Minimum 14,521,210    4,774,863   
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Table 7.  Grain Flows Across Market Area (Scenario: Case study elevator pays $0.02 
premium/IP bushel) 
 Grain  Variety 
   #2 Corn  Nutritionally 
Dense  White #1  Soybeans  High Protein  Tofu 
  (Bushels) 
Case Study Elevator        
Mean 9,043,687  618,761  551,383  2,743,916  122,352  109,437 
Standard Deviation  575,192  435,552  312,596  18,673  107,839  105,290 
Minimum 8,409,998  35,384  28,206  2,168,306  8,115  3,238 
Maximum 10,915,636  1,805,940  1,308,632  2,744,691  414,611  392,400 
Competitor 1        
Mean   1,077,450  1,147,846  229,767  224,355 
Standard Deviation    446,862  461,070  203,693  186,428 
Minimum   79,817  104,740  0   11,027 
Maximum     1,720,803  1,763,797    624,630  584,953 
Competitor 2        
Mean 19,329,419  1,382,085  1,738,636  6,167,384  934,509  890,235 
Standard Deviation  247,227  602,596  996,291  29,594  415,835  391,257 
Minimum 18,460,108  224,351  210,009  5,276,414  116,125  119,575 
Maximum 19,628,020  3,043,517  3,917,884  6,170,657  1,420,636  1,347,242 
Competitor 3        
Mean 10,274,186  818,644  715,853  3,279,815  156,613  148,812 
Standard Deviation  115,214  317,992  238,184  73,174  108,409  102,989 
Minimum 9,840,215  139,296  84,898  3,275,229  8,581  8,163 
Maximum 10,447,080  1,922,536  957,371  5,513,053  331,680  316,184 
Competitor 4        
Mean 15,172,548    4,845,150   
Standard Deviation  215,612    25,896   
Minimum 14,526,479    4,078,492   








  20 
Table 8.  Grain Flows Across Market Area (Scenario: Competitor 2 reduces IP premium variability) 
 Grain  Variety 
   #2 Corn  Nutritionally 
Dense  White #1  Soybeans  High Protein  Tofu 
  (Bushels) 
Case Study Elevator        
Mean 9,046,997  640,521  757,271  2,744,542  0  427,148 
Standard Deviation  578,789  259,420  14,601  2,731  0  0 
Minimum 8,409,998  63,475  723,157  2,669,853  0  427,148 
Maximum 10,915,636  1,096,385  791,007  2,746,210  0  427,148 
Competitor 1        
Mean   1,313,676  1,458,515  288,879  478,691 
Standard Deviation    167,677  27,517  7,831  2,906 
Minimum   232,615  1,400,069  274,524  471,237 
Maximum     1,462,207  1,566,882    312,644  485,892 
Competitor 2        
Mean 19,327,574  1,162,818  1,318,373  6,168,383  137,394  467,000 
Standard Deviation  249,731  209,324  13,870  5,471  5,363  2,906 
Minimum 18,487,976  179,707  1,262,712  6,129,329  121,922  459,800 
Maximum 19,628,020  1,371,676  1,349,068  6,170,657  151,354  474,455 
Competitor 3        
Mean 10,273,568  787,491  619,559  3,277,156  1,016,968  0 
Standard Deviation  116,131  566,693  1,252  7,359  6,431  0 
Minimum 9,840,215  88,132  600,967  3,273,710  995,173  0 
Maximum 10,445,747  3,282,646  622,808  3,462,220  1,031,950  0 
Competitor 4        
Mean 15,171,700    4,846,183   
Standard Deviation  215,717    6,562   
Minimum 14,521,210    4,774,863   




This paper has examined grain flow distributions across an illustrative market in 
north central Indiana from a case study elevator’s perspective.  Arbitrage conditions are 
employed by producers to determine their best delivery option, represented by the highest 
return net of assembly costs.   
In general, near-by competitors offering a $0.02 over price premium result in 
decreased volumes of higher-valued high protein soybeans but increased volumes of the  21 
highest-valued tofu variety by almost twice as much.  Smaller premiums associated with 
IP corn varieties are equally as distance-sensitive; the case study elevator’s location 
makes them an attractive delivery site for producers who receive smaller premiums to 
offset transport costs.  This paper highlights the relationship between linear transportation 
costs and IP premium structures confronting the producer.  Results suggest that the 
distance threshold for IP grains with smaller premiums is closer than it is for higher 
premium types.  This paper began on the assumption that IP premiums would influence 
producer delivery decisions.  Findings indicate that the elevator manager’s need to be 
aware of the magnitude of variety premiums in assessing changes to their grain flows.  
Across premium scenarios, commodity volumes changed only nominally.  This is 
expected in that they are only indirectly affected by IP market premiums.  The underlying 
issue however is the cost in operational efficiency as the IP grains are added to an 
individual elevator’s facility.  Examination of the costs of incorporating IP grains into a 
facility’s product mix will involve evaluation of the economics costs of adding additional 
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